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Cognitive Science, in all its guises, has not yet accorded any fundamental importance to
the social dimension of human cognition. In order to illustrate the possibilities that have not
so far been developed, this article seeks to pursue the idea, ﬁrst put forward by Durkheim,
that the major categories which render conceptual thought possible may actually have
a social origin. Durkheim illustrated his thesis, convincingly enough, by examining the
societies of Australian aborigines. The aim here is to extend this idea to cover the case
of the conceptual categories underpinning modern Western science, as they developed
historically ﬁrst in Ancient Greece, and then at the Renaissance.These major non-empirical
concepts include those of abstract Space (Euclidean space, perfectly homogeneous in
all its dimensions); abstract Time (conceived as spatially linearized, with the possibility
of imaginatively going back and forth); and a number of canonical logical categories
(equality, abstract quantity, essential versus accidental properties, the continuous and the
discontinuous, the transcendental. . .). Sohn-Rethel (1978) has proposed that the heart
of the conceptual categories in question is to be found in an analysis of the exchange
abstraction. This hypothesis will be ﬂeshed out by examining the co-emergence of new
social structures and new forms of conceptual thought in the course of historical evolution.
This includes the Renaissance, which saw the emergence of both Capitalism and Modern
Science; and on the contemporary situation, where the form of social life is dominated by
ﬁnancial speculation which goes together with the advent of automation in the processes
of production. It is concluded that Cognitive Science, and in particular the nascent paradigm
of Enaction, would do well to broaden its transdisciplinary scope to include the dimensions
of sociology and anthropology.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the major merits of Cognitive Science is that it provides a
trans-disciplinary approach to phenomena that are only too often
fragmented into separate disciplines that only communicate on
the fringes. Right from the start, the “Computational Theory of
Mind” (CTM), whatever its defects and limitations, provides a
principled connection between the ﬁelds of psychology, neuro-
science, and linguistics. However, there is one major discipline
in the human sciences that is remarkably absent from the syn-
thesis achieved by cognitive science: and that is sociology. To be
sure, there is a whole ﬁeld which goes by the promising name of
“social cognition.” But when one looks closer, it turns out that
what is involved is the way that “social factors” can inﬂuence or
“color” cognition after the event ; or alternatively, that when both
cognition and human society are already in place, some cogni-
tive resources can be allocated to thinking about social forms (for
example kinship relations, or even explicitly political matters).
What is missing is any inkling of the idea that the social dimension
may be actually constitutive of humanity itself; that a population
of individuals who were not already profoundly socialized would
not be properly human. If this is correct, then the relative weak-
ness of sociology in cognitive science is a fundamental ﬂaw. This
critical remark holds for all the currents in contemporary cognitive
science. It applies not just to the classical TCM, but also to all the
connectionist and neo-connectionist variants, as well as to the
nascent alternative of Enaction (Varela et al., 1991; Stewart et al.,
2010).
This is clearly a major issue; and it would require at least a
whole book to do it anything like justice. In the space of a single
article, all I can do is to indicate schematically the existence of the
problem; and then to illustrate what may be involved by a single
case-study which will be inevitably very limited and partial with
respect to the problem as a whole. The speciﬁc area I have chosen,
in order to attempt a constructive proposal, is that of the genesis
of conceptual categories.
THE NATURE OF CONCEPTUAL CATEGORIES
A PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM: THE GENESIS OF CONCEPTUAL
CATEGORIES
As a point of entry into the question I wish to examine, I
will base myself primarily on a little-known book by Durkheim
(1915). Although this book was published a century ago, it has
been virtually ignored. Consequently, the ideas it presents are
as new and original as when they ﬁrst appeared; and I make
no apology for taking it as a basic reference. Today, Durkheim
is mainly known as one of the founders of modern sociology;
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but it is worth noting that he had a genuine culture in phi-
losophy. The question of the nature and origin of conceptual
categories has indeed a long history in the philosophical tra-
dition; to introduce the question, I will quote directly from
Durkheim:
“At the root of all our judgments there are a certain number of essential
ideas which dominate all our intellectual life; they are what philoso-
phers since Aristotle have called the categories of the understanding:
ideas of time, space, class, number, cause, substance, and so on. These
conceptual categories correspond to the most universal properties of
things. Thought seems unable to liberate itself from them without
destroying itself, for it would appear that we cannot think of objects
that are not in time and space, which have no number, and so on.
Other ideas are contingent and unsteady; we can conceive of their
being unknown to a certain man, a society, or an epoch; but these basic
concepts appear to be practically inseparable from the normal working
of the human mind. They are like the solid framework which encloses
all possible thought.”
(Durkheim, 1915, pp. 21–22)
The next question, then, is this: where do these categories come
from? In the philosophical tradition, there are two main answers:
Empiricism andApriorism. Empiricism is the doctrine according to
which the categories are built bottom-up, by bits and pieces, on the
basis of regularities in perceptual experience. This viewpoint was
developed historically by the British Empiricists: Locke, Berkeley,
and Hume. It culminated with Hume’s famous conclusion that the
notion of “causality” could only be an illusion (Hume, 1748). The
reason is that, however, often we observe that event B follows event
A, this can never be a sufﬁcient reason to arrive at the idea that A
is a genuine cause of B; we can never be sure that next time, A may
fail to be followed by B, or that B could occur without necessarily
being preceded by A. It was this scandalous conclusion, that the
concept of “causality” is only an illusion, that provoked Kant to
“awake from his dogmatic slumbers,” and lead him to propose his
“Copernican revolution” in epistemology (Kant, 1781). Far from
experience leading to the categories itwas the other around: if there
were no categories in the ﬁrst place, no real experience would exist
at all. Kant expressed this by saying that the categories exist a priori.
Now the problem here is that these twin doctrines, empiricism
and apriorism, are both severely defective. Empiricism is decisively
refuted by Kant’s critique; it just does not hold up. On the other
hand, if we are looking for a scientiﬁc answer to the question of
where the categories come from, apriorism is totally inadequate: to
say that they exist“a priori” is just putting a name on our ignorance
and begging the question. The empiricist answer, saying that the
categories derive gradually over time on the basis of empirical
experience, is not valid; but empiricism, for all its faults, does
at least attempt to give an answer, whereas apriorism just eludes
the question altogether. It is arguably because each of these twin
doctrines is about equally defective that the philosophical debate
between them has been going on for centuries, and would seem to
be interminable.
It is important to recognize here that relatively recent devel-
opments in cognitive science – in particular the currents
of embodied cognition, extended cognition and distributed
cognition – represent a signiﬁcant advance with respect to the
“stand-off” between empiricism and apriorism as diagnosed by
Durkheim. “Extended cognition” involves recognizing the role of
technical artifacts and technological systems in establishing specif-
ically human cognition (Stiegler, 1998; Havelange et al., 2003),
and this opens up one route to recognizing the importance of the
social domain. The current of “distributed cognition”attributes an
important role to interactions between individuals. The weakness
of such approaches, in the present perspective, is that they focus
on interactions, which presupposes that the individuals between
whom such interactions can occur are already fully constituted.
They thus fall into the trap of “methodological individualism”
which has been roundly criticized by Giddens (1977). In the same
vein, Steiner and Stewart (2009) have argued that the term“social”
is misused when it is used to refer to a situation where there are
merely inter-individual interactions (such as the phrase “social
insects” to denote ant colonies). What is missing is a proper focus
on the social structures which implement the “social synthesis,” a
theme we shall return to below. To sum up, none of these recent
developments, in spite of their undoubted interest for cognitive
science, have yet attributed a fundamental role to the social domain
as such. The nascent paradigmof Enaction,which has already been
mentioned, would provide a suitable framework for developing a
fuller appreciation of the social dimension of human cognition;
this has not yet been done, but this article is meant as a step in this
direction.
A SOCIAL ORIGIN FOR THE CATEGORIES?
It was in this situation, that of an awkward stalemate, that
Durkheim (1915) proposed an audacious and radically original
hypothesis. In order to introduce his hypothesis that the cate-
gories have a social origin, Durkheim notes that there are actually
two sorts of knowledge: on the one hand empirical knowledge,
which relates directly to the interactions between an individ-
ual and his environment1; and on the other hand knowledge
which is framed in terms of the categories, that are essen-
tially social in nature. “Between these two sorts of knowledge
there is all the difference which exists between the individ-
ual and the social, and one can no more derive the second
from the ﬁrst than one can deduce society from the individual”
(Durkheim, 1915, p. 28). Durkheim concludes his Introduction as
follows:
“Thus renovated, the theory of knowledge seems destined to unite the
opposing advantages of the two rival theories. It keeps all the essential
principles of the apriorists; but at the same time it is inspired by that
samepositive spirit which the empiricists have striven to satisfy. It leaves
the faculty of reason its speciﬁc power, but it accounts for it and does
so without leaving the world of observable phenomena. It afﬁrms the
duality of our intellectual life, but it explains it, and with natural causes.
The categories. . . appear as priceless instruments of thought which the
human groups have laboriously forged through the centuries andwhere
they have accumulated the best of their intellectual capital. A complete
section of the history of humanity is resumed therein. . . . This is how it
is legitimate to compare the categories with tools2; for on its side, a tool
1Durkheim remarks elsewhere that if a man were reduced to having only empir-
ical knowledge based on individual perceptions of this sort, “he would be
indistinguishable from the beasts” (Durkheim, 1915, p. 487).
2In view of the social importance of tools, and indeed the thesis that “Technology
is Anthropologically Constitutive” (Stiegler, 1998; Havelange et al., 2003; Steiner,
2010) it is fascinating to see here that Durkheim himself spontaneously makes the
association between conceptual categories, tools and social institutions.
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is material accumulated capital. There is a close relationship between
the three ideas of tool, category and institution.”
(Durkheim, 1915, p. 32)
On the face of it, this would appear to be an attractive proposi-
tion. Itmust be admitted, however, that a century later,Durkheim’s
proposal has received very little attention from the academic com-
munity. The brute fact is that it has not even been criticized;
essentially, it has just been ignored. A possible reason for this, or at
least a contributing factor, is that the bulk of Durkheim’s long book
is devoted to an analysis of the society of theAustralian aborigines.
It is therefore important to emphasize that Durkheim’s choice of
a terrain to gather empirical evidence in support of his hypothesis
was in no way guided by a preference for the bizarre or the exotic,
but for clear methodological reasons: “in the study of any natural
phenomenon which undergoes evolution, there is an immense
advantage in starting with the most primitive3 form known.”
Durkheim illustrates this precept quite explicitly with the case of
living organisms: “Biological evolution has been conceived quite
differently ever since it has been known that mono-cellular beings
exist. . .. The discovery of unicellular beings has transformed the
current idea of life. Since in these very simple beings, life is
reduced to its essential traits, these are less easily misunderstood.”
(Durkheim, 1915, pp. 18–19). Similarly: “Primitive civilisations
offer privileged cases because they are simple cases. That which
is accessory or secondary has not yet come to hide the principal
elements. All is reduced to that which is indispensable, to that
without which there could be no society. But that which is indis-
pensable is also that which is essential, that is to say, that which we
must know before all else... But primitive societies do not merely
aid us in disengaging the constituent elements of society; they also
have the great advantage that they facilitate the explanation of it.
Since the facts there are simpler, the relations between them are
more apparent. The reasons with which men account for their acts
have not yet been elaborated and denatured by studied reﬂection;
they are nearer and more closely related to the motives which have
really determined these acts” (Durkheim, 1915, pp. 18–19). Thus,
the reason why Durkheim drew mainly on ethnographic studies of
Australian aborigines, with supplementary material from studies
of Native Americans, was not“simply for the pleasure of telling the
particularities and singularities of a very archaic (society)”; but
because he hoped thereby to approach the essential constituent
elements of human society, and to explain them.
Now Durkheim’s adherence to this methodological principle
did indeed bear fruit in the clarity and relative simplicity of his
conclusions. It became rapidly apparent that in all these “primi-
tive” societies, there seems to be an anthropological invariant: the
very nexus of their social life is provided by religion: but a religion
which is in large part foreign to all idea of divinity or gods. What
is at the root of these religious practices is a distinction between
the profane and the sacred. Durkheim therefore goes on to ask
what could be at the root of this distinction. An Empiricist might
3This reference, here and later, to “primitive” societies is of course politically incor-
rect. I nevertheless employ this term (in “scare quotes”) in the same sense of
“primordial” that Durkheim uses when referring to single-cell organisms. It should
go without saying, but maybe even better by saying it explicitly, that when I do
use this term in this text, there is no negative connotation (on the contrary, these
societies were arguably far less alienated than our own contemporary society).
suggest that the notion of“sacred”could derive fromextraordinary
and possibly “supernatural” events, such as cosmological rarities,
showers of falling stars and the like (the theory called “naturism”);
or maybe it derives from the phenomena of dreams (the theory of
“animism”). But Durkheim very properly dismisses both of these
suggestions: since all these phenomena, naturist or animist, do
actually occur in the realm of “natural events,” they cannot for the
life of them suggest the notion of the “sacred” as different in kind
from the profane. But, Durkheim continues, there are indeed two
different sorts of reality with which human beings are confronted.
On the one hand, there is the ordinary everyday reality of perceived
objects and processes (which corresponds non-problematically to
the class of the profane); but on the other, there is indeed a quite
different sort of reality, which is equally non-negotiable by an
individual, and that is. . . social reality! So Durkheim arrives at
the conclusion that the “sacred” is neither more nor less than the
form in which “the social” presents itself to the consciousness of
individuals in these “primitive” societies. His task then becomes to
show that the conceptual categories of time, space, and so on have
their natural origins in the religious categories by which social life
is ordered. Hewas able tomuster an immense amount of empirical
data to support this hypothesis.
By means of a very thorough and critical appraisal of the
ethnographic literature, Durkheim came to the conclusion that,
quite generally, the “elementary form of the religious life”was that
known as “totemism.” Each tribe is divided into a certain num-
ber of clans (usually a dozen or so). Each clan is identiﬁed by its
emblematic totem, which is often but not necessarily a particular
species of animal or plant (an additional indication of the sacred
nature of animals is given by the cave-paintings at Lascaux and
elsewhere – Curtis, 2006). The totem is sacred for members of
the clan; it is forbidden for consumption (except possibly under
special ritual circumstances). This system is inseparably religious
and social, conﬁrming Durkheim’s theory concerning the inti-
mate connection between the two. We now come a crucial point:
for the Australian, everything which is in the universe is consid-
ered to be a part of the tribe; consequently, just like men, all
things known are distributed between the clans (Durkheim, 1915,
pp. 166–168, where Durkheim cites some examples). Naturally
enough, things which are attributed to the same clan tend to have
some similarities; this is particularly clear in the case of the phra-
tries4, where there are just two classes. Thus, if the white cockatoo
is in one phratry, the black cockatoo will be in the other; and the
moon is regroupedwith the black cockatoowhereas the sun is with
the white cockatoo. However, as Durkheim notes with insistence,
“the feeling of resemblances is one thing and the idea of class is
another. . .. The contents cannot furnish the frame intowhich they
ﬁt. . .This is why the idea of classmust not be confusedwith that of
a generic image. . . The best proof of the distance separating these
two notions is that an animal is able to form generic images though
ignorant of the art of thinking in classes and species.” (Durkheim,
1915, pp. 171–172). Thus, the very notion of “class”, and of system-
atically and logically classifying entities into a system of classes, is
a clear example of a non-empirical, a priori conceptual category.
4Although it is not always the case, far from it, certain tribes are organized in just
two phratries, with half the clans belonging to each phratry.
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What we see here is that the very ﬁrst systematic classiﬁcations that
we meet with in history are “modeled upon the social organiza-
tion, or rather that they have taken the forms of society as their
framework. It is the phratries which have served as classes, and the
clans as species.” (Durkheim, 1915, p. 169). One could scarcely ask
for a clearer or more direct vindication of Durkheim’s hypothesis
that the a priori categories have a social origin. Durkheim provides
analogous demonstrations for other major categories. We cannot
go into the details here, but will have to content ourselves with
the barest summary: “it is the rhythm of social life which is at the
basis of the category of time; the territory occupied by the society
furnished the material for the category of space; it is the collective
force which was the prototype of the concept of efﬁcient force, an
essential element in the category of causality.” (Durkheim, 1915,
p. 488).
Durkheim’s methodological choice of starting with “primitive”
societies thus paid clear dividends. It does, however, have one dis-
advantage: it can leave the impression that for “primitive savages”
there may well be a relation between forms of thought and forms
of social life; but that when it comes to civilized societies, espe-
cially in the modernWestern world, this “primitive” stage has been
surpassed and there is no longer any such relation. This was not
at all Durkheim’s own view; he thought that he was not at the end
of the story, but just at the beginning. He remarked: “Attributing
social origins to logical thought is not debasing it or diminishing
its value or reducing it to nothing more than a system of artiﬁcial
combinations; on the contrary, it is relating it to a cause which
implies it naturally. But this is not saying that the ideas elaborated
in this way are at once adequate for their object.” (Durkheim,1915,
p. 493). Thus, Durkheim considered that he had laid the founda-
tions for a whole new research program, consisting of following
through the whole evolution of human thought, and of relating
this to concomitant changes in the forms of social organization.
In the next section, we will attempt to respond to this challenge.
ABSTRACT THOUGHT AND THE EXCHANGE ABSTRACTION
THE EXCHANGE ABSTRACTION
The aim of this section is to examine whether there is a plausible
social basis for the major categories of modern Western thought:
more speciﬁcally, for the categories which Kant himself identiﬁed
as being a priori, i.e., not derived from empirical experience.
A necessary prerequisite for this task is to characterize the forms
of social life in an appropriate way. To this end, I will introduce
here the concept of “social synthesis.” Every human society in
which there is some degree of division of labor must necessarily
have a mechanism which provides functional answers the follow-
ing three questions: (i) What are the productive activities which
will be performed? (ii) How is the sum of all the work to be per-
formed to be distributed between the members of society: who
will do what? (iii) How are the fruits of this labor to be divided
up amongst the members of society: who will receive what? – It
is a question of the viability of any form of social life that there
should be a mechanism which provides an effective answer to
this question (not necessarily explicitly, but in terms of practical
results); in the absence of adequate answers, there will be anarchy
and the dissolution of the society. It is worth emphasizing that
this question of the “social synthesis” is not merely ancillary; it is
absolutely fundamental to the very constitution of human society
as such.
Now in very broad terms, one can make a distinction between
two major types of mechanism for ensuring the social synthesis,
which thereby condition two very different sorts of human society;
I will call them“traditional” societies and“market”societies. In the
great majority of human societies in the past, the mechanism of
social synthesis can be designated by the term “traditional”: there
is a deﬁnite sort of social order, with a speciﬁcation of the roles
of the various members of society, which is reproduced from gen-
eration to generation in an essentially unchanged form. In many
cases, this social order comprises institutions of discussion and
negotiation: the African palaver can serve as a metonymical exam-
ple. One can also speak of a “communal” mode of production,
where the nature of the productive activities themselves integrate
in large measure the distribution of their fruits and, upstream, the
corresponding division of labor. We may remark that there is some
proximity here with animal communities, where in some cases the
differentiation of activities necessary for collective survival can be
quite sophisticated. However, since no animals have the capacity
for language, there is no animal equivalent to the institution of the
palaver type.
By contrast with these “traditional” forms of social organiza-
tion, there are societies (including our own contemporary society)
that we can designate by the term “market” societies. Here, a
large part of the social synthesis is neither traditional, nor the
object of relatively direct discussions, nor integrated with the
productive activities themselves; it is delegated to the mecha-
nisms of a market economy. In this case, the social synthesis is
achieved by the famous “invisible hand” of Adam Smith, accord-
ing to the laws of supply and demand which are balanced by
the mechanism of prices. In other words, the social synthesis
is not directly achieved as such; it is, rather, the “emergent”
result of a whole series of purely local economic decisions, with-
out there being anywhere a coherent vision or conscious will
at the level of the whole. It is important to emphasize that in
market societies, characterized by a division of labor, economic
exchanges play a fundamental role because they determine the
form of the social synthesis. The life of each individual depends
on the activities of production and consumption; but without the
intervention of market exchanges none of these activities would
occur. Each economic crisis is an object lesson in the fact that
the activities of production and consumption are perturbed pre-
cisely to the degree that the functioning of economic exchanges is
compromised.
The cornerstone of a fully developed market economy is the
social institution of money. It is important and interesting to
note that the invention of money as such was not immedi-
ate. The successive steps in what was a long historical process,
involving a considerable investment of collective intelligence,
have been carefully documented in the work of Simmel (1900).
Brieﬂy, some of the major steps were: gift and counter-gift; direct
barter; the appearance of certain commodities which were not
quite like the others because they were systematically used as
intermediaries in market exchanges (grain is a good example);
the use of precious metals; and the ﬁrst instances of coined
money, which mark a ﬁrst culmination of the process and will
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serve as the basis for our analysis of the exchange abstraction.
In what follows, I will base myself essentially on the work of
Sohn-Rethel (1978).
Market exchange involves an abstraction because it requires a
rigorous relation of mutual exclusion between use and exchange.
The activities of use on one hand, and activities of exchange on
the other, are not simply different; they must take place sepa-
rately, during different and mutually exclusive temporal periods.
The reason is that the exchange activity serves the sole purpose of
a change in owner, in other words a change in the purely social
status of the commodities as elements of private property. In
order for such a change to take place on the basis of a nego-
tiated agreement, the material status of the commodities, their
physical condition, must remain unchanged during the whole
period of the negotiation – or rather, which is even more relevant
here, their material status must be presumed to be unchanged.
Sohn-Rethel (1978) provides a graphic presentation of this key
point:
“There, in the market-place and in shop windows, things stand still.
They are under the spell of one activity only; to change owners. They
stand there waiting to be sold. While they are there for exchange they
are not there for use. A commodity marked out at a deﬁnite price,
for instance, is looked upon as being frozen to absolute immutability
throughout the time during which its price remains unaltered. And
the spell does not only bind the doings of man. Even nature herself is
supposed to abstain from any ravages in the body of this commodity
and to hold her breath, as it were, for the sake of this social business of
man. Evidently, even the aspect of non-human nature is affected by the
banishment of use from the sphere of exchange.”
(Sohn-Rethel, 1978, p. 25)
The practical activity of exchange does not in itself have any
meaning in terms of nature; it is purely social by its constitution
and scope. Nevertheless, the transfer of ownership that is nego-
tiated under property laws in no way lacks physical reality itself.
Exchange involves the movement of the commodities in time and
space from one owner to another, and constitutes events of no
less physical reality than the use-activities which it rules out. It is
indeed precisely because their physical reality is on a par that these
two kinds of activity, exchange and use, are so mutually exclusive.
Thus, exchange is an abstraction because, while remaining insep-
arable from use (otherwise no-one would bother to exchange the
commodities in question), it quite rigorously excludes it. At the
same time, it is a real abstraction, because it is a perfectly real event
in time and space.
To sum up the argument so far: in market societies, there
are two registers of spatio-temporal reality which exist side-by-
side, but which mutually exclude each other. This point will be so
important for what follows that it will be useful to employ speciﬁc
terms. In German, the register of “use” is designated by the term
“ﬁrst nature” (erste Natur); this register is entirely and substan-
tially material. The register of “exchange” is designated by the
term “second nature” (zweite Natur); this register is entirely social
and, by its constitution, perfectly abstract. The same term“nature”
is employed to indicate that these two worlds are endowed with
an equal degree of spatio-temporal reality, and that they are inex-
tricably combined in the fabrication of our daily life in a market
society.
The strange relation between“ﬁrst nature”and“second nature”
is brought to its peak by the social institution of coined money.
Money is an abstract, paradoxical entity: it performs a decisive
function in the social synthesis, but unbeknown to the actors con-
cerned (we will come back to this point). But even if the“exchange
abstraction” is practically never thought of as such by economic
agents, no animal can begin to understand what money is: it is
a register that is solely accessible to human beings5. Sohn-Rethel
(1978) makes this point in striking fashion, and I will cite him
again:
“Take your dog with you to the butcher and watch how much he under-
stands of the goings-on when you purchase your meat. It is a great deal
and even includes a keen sense of property which will make him snap at
a stranger’s hand daring to come near the meat his master has obtained
and which he will be allowed to carry home in his mouth. But when
you have to tell him ‘Wait, doggy, I haven’t paid yet!’ his understanding
is at an end. The pieces of metal or paper which he watches you hand
over, and which carry your scent, he knows, of course; he has seen them
before. But their function as money lies outside the animal range. It is
not related to our natural or physical being, but comprehensible only
in our social interrelations as human beings. It has reality in time and
space, has the quality of a real occurrence taking place between me and
the butcher and requiring a means of payment of material reality. The
meaning of this action registers exclusively in our human minds and
yet has deﬁnite reality outside it – a social reality, though, sharply con-
trasting with the material realities accessible to my dog. Here we have
the spheres of the “ﬁrst” and “second nature” which we distinguished
earlier side by side, and unmistakably divided.”
(Sohn-Rethel, 1978, p. 45)
Marx says quite explicitly that the exchange abstraction never
receives a mental representation as such, since its sole expression
resides in the act of considering that the value of one commod-
ity is equal to the value of another (Marx, 1867, p. 162). Gold,
or silver, or any other material entity which lends to money its
instantiation as a visible, palpable body is only a metaphor for the
exchange value, it is not the abstraction as such. In fact, the mate-
rial instantiations of money do more to mask than to reveal its
veritable “second nature.”
Historically, when commodity exchanges spread, becoming
multilateral and involving a wide range of commodities, there
was an overwhelming practical need to employ one of these com-
modities as a general means for the exchanges of the others.
This new role did not in itself, immediately, confer the com-
modity in question with an appearance that is different from
before; but as a means of exchange, it is invested with the pos-
tulate that it should undergo no material change as long as it
continues to exert that function. It is therefore easy to under-
stand that the choice of a “standard-commodity” will fall on
an entity that by virtue of its physical durability, its divisibility
5Chen et al. (2006) have suggested that capuchin monkeys may have some capacity
to engage in exchanges with conspeciﬁcs. It is actually reassuring that some animals
may have an opening in this direction, since this provides a basis for possible evo-
lution towards distinctively human forms of understanding. However, no behavior
of this sort is found spontaneously in the wild. It must be re-emphasized that a
number of so-called “primitive” human societies (Aborigines and native Americans
in their natural state before meeting with Europeans) make no use of money; and,
as Simmel (1900) has pointed out so clearly, even in humans the development of a
monetary system was a long and very gradual process, spanning centuries. The basic
point made is thus remains valid.
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and its mobility is relatively conform to the required proper-
ties. In this way, the postulate of immutability, which has its
true source in the abstraction of exchange, quite rapidly acquires
the appearance of a consequence of its particular properties. The
fact that a special “aura” attends this commodity “not like the
others” does more to conﬁrm than to refute this misleading
appearance.
This confusion reaches a summit when the choice for a
“standard-commodity” falls on one of the precious metals. On
the occasion of each market transaction, it was necessary not only
to weigh the metal, but also to melt it and test for purity; in short,
it was necessary to relapse into treating them according to their
ﬁrst nature. And precisely for this reason, they failed in the end to
perform their function as a universalmeans of exchange. This deﬁ-
ciency only found its solution with the invention of coined money:
this step, which was to have such weighty consequences, was ﬁrst
taken in Ionia around 680 BC. With coined money the preced-
ing relation, where its status as exchange-value was subordinated
and masked by its material, ﬁrst-nature status, was overturned. A
piece of coined money is stamped in order to signify that it is to
serve as a means of exchange and not as a use-object. Its weight
and metallic purity are guaranteed by the emitting authority; thus,
if it happens that a coin of money has lost weight through wear
and tear, the authority in question will replace it free of charge. Its
physicalmatter has becomemerely the bearer of a social function6.
A piece of coined money is an entity which conforms to the pos-
tulates of the exchange-abstraction; it is presumed to be composed
of a substance which is absolutely unchanging, on which time has
no effect, and which is thus unlike any material substance which
actually exists in nature.
ABSTRACT THOUGHT
We come now to a crucial point. We have characterized the form of
social life in societies governedby amarket economy in termsof the
exchange abstraction; is it now possible to identify a corresponding
form of thought, and more precisely a corresponding set of “a
priori” conceptual categories?
Sohn-Rethel (1978) introduces his response to this question
with a pleasant thought-experiment. The leading role is played
by a philosophically minded Athenian from Classical Greece, who
asks himself searching questions about the coins of money in his
pocket: “What sort of substance should these coins be made of?”
As none other than the great Plato emphasized clearly, all mate-
rial objects existing in the world are perishable, corruptible, and
unable to resist the ravages of time; but it seems clear that pre-
cisely because of this, ordinary material objects are not properly
suitable to the function of money. Now Plato also speaks of enti-
ties of another sort, which are spotless, eternal, perfectly pure,
and always strictly identical to themselves: he denotes them by
6This also explains how it is that the same function can be performed by simple
pieces of paper. . . as long as they bear inscriptions which cannot be easily forged so
that they carry the same guarantee. An anecdote may provide a pleasant illustration
of the striking contrast between ﬁrst and second nature which comes into play
with bank-notes. When I was seven years old, I inadvertently left a bank-note in
my trouser pocket when it went to be laundered. I was amazed to see my mother
recuperate some damp fragments of the note, which still bore in barely legible form
the number of the note, whereupon she took them to the bank and obtained in
exchange. . . a brand-new bank-note!
the honorary title of “Ideas.” So, our Athenian asks himself, “are
coins of money actually pure Ideas?” Worried, he takes hold of
the coins in his pocket, and thinks hard: “These coins are real
things; and they are real not just for me, but for all my fellow
citizens who accept them in payment for wares. Might money be
immaterial? – what an absurd idea, no coin could properly be
money if it did not have material reality.” So he comes to the
reassuring conclusion that the substance that his coins are made
of is a real substance, as real as any other substance existing in
time and space. And yet, this substance is quite different from
all these other ordinary substances, because this one is just as
immutable as the entities that Plato speaks of. But how can a
substance which is immune to the ravages of time exist in time?
Nowhere in the whole of nature, and nowhere within the lim-
its of sensory perception, can any such substance be found. But
then, how can our Athenian know about this extraordinary sort
of substance if he cannot see it or hear it or touch it? He knows
about it by thought and only by thought. Never in all his life
has he ever come across this sort of entity, something which is
obstinately and uncompromisingly real and yet which is detached
from any of the sensory qualities by which things are usually real
for us.
This reﬂection can introduce us to more detailed examination
of the formal analogies which exist between the conceptual cate-
gories of philosophical thought on one hand, and the distinctive
features of the exchange abstraction on the other. It is important
to emphasize here that what characterizes each and every one of
these conceptual categories is their “canonically apodictic” nature:
quite generically, each of them has the remarkable property that
once they are identiﬁed, in their ideality, it appears intrinsically
manifest that they could not be other than they are. At the same
time, they are radically non-empirical: there is nothing in our daily
experience of nature which is sufﬁciently similar for it to be at the
origin of the concept. What Sohn-Rethel (1978) is suggesting is
that actually, there is something in our daily experience that does
ﬁt the bill: however, this is not any sort of material reality, but
social reality.
We therefore hold the germof an understanding as to how it can
be that certain particularities of the exchange abstraction – which
is a social form par excellence – can be at the root of concep-
tual categories which are both radically non-empirical, and which
can yet be applied to think about material, physical reality. This
may be a good place to remark that the relation between social
forms and forms of thought, as it is manifesting itself here, is
not simple; it is not a question of direct linear causation in one
direction or the other. The social forms and the thought forms
come about together; while there is a sense in which it is the social
forms which provide the ground for the conceptual forms (Sohn-
Rethel’s presentation can be read in this way), it is surely at least
as much the other way round: the cognitive capacity to think in
a certain way is a condition for the corresponding form of social
life to arise. It is salutary to recall here, as Simmel (1900) has so
clearly shown, that the emergence of societies based on a market
economy occurred only very gradually, over the course of many
centuries. One of the reasons for this is surely that human men-
talities had to change in order for this evolution in social forms to
be possible.
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With this, we have set up the case for supposing that the
exchange abstraction may indeed be at the root of the basic con-
ceptual categories of Western thought. It now remains to ﬂesh out
this account by developing it in more detail. In the next section, we
shall do this in two ways; ﬁrstly, by looking at a set of ﬁne-grained
“homologies”; and secondly, by looking at the correspondences
between social and conceptual forms as they have co-evolved in
the course of human history.
FLESHING OUT THE RELATION BETWEEN SOCIAL AND
CONCEPTUAL FORMS
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EXCHANGE ABSTRACTION IN ANCIENT
GREECE: THE HOMOLOGIES
The account we have given of the correspondence between the
exchange abstraction and the abstract categories of Platonic
thought have so far been expressed in rather general terms. If this
relation is real, it should be possible to spell it out in more detailed
terms. Sohn-Rethel (1978) has risen to this challenge, and we shall
now present the set of homologies between seven of the canoni-
cal set of basic categories, for which he has found corresponding
aspects of the exchange abstraction.
Solipsism
The doctrine according to which “I alone exist” (solus ipse) is a
leading leitmotiv of Western philosophy. This doctrine reached
the summits with Descartes and Berkeley. In Descartes’ famous
“Cogito ergo sum,” the “self” in question guarantees its own exis-
tence – the very idea would collapse if the “existence” in question
extended to anything other than the subject of the cogito. Berke-
ley deliberately pushes this solipsism to a provocative limit with
his “Esse est percipi”: “to be” is neither more nor less than being
perceived. In other words, it is not only other subjects but the
whole world which only exists to the extent that I perceive it.
With his usual clarity, Kant summarizes the apodictic character
of solipsism: “there is no foundation in theoretical reason which
makes it possible to infer the existence of another subject.” This
is of course an affront to common sense: in ordinary everyday
life, no-one seriously doubts for a moment the existence of other
subjects, nor the real existence of the external world. So where
could this preposterous idea, which is clearly non-empirical, have
come from? There is undeniably a certain irony in looking for an
origin in the social domain, because solipsism would seem to be
the very antithesis of sociability. But Sohn-Rethel (1978) rises to
the occasion.
Since solipsism is a private thought par excellence, the ﬁrst idea
that comes to mind concerning the social sphere is that of private
property. This is all the more plausible in that at ﬁrst sight it would
seem that the institutional principle of private property is logically
prior to market exchanges. But Sohn-Rethel (1978) argues that
actually the relation is the other way around: the principle of
“private property”is actually only a retrospective conceptualisation
of necessities that are already inherent in the social act of exchange.
Let us look at this more closely.
During the whole duration of an exchange transaction, the
commodity in question must imperatively be withdrawn from
the sphere of use. This is what we have already analyzed above,
where we noted that market exchanges induce a rigorous mutual
exclusion between use and exchange. We now have to pursue
this analysis, by examining the consequences of this separation
for the consciousness of the agents. To do this, we will succes-
sively examine the two aspects: ﬁrst that of use, then that of
exchange.
- Concerning use, we may note that the minds of the partici-
pants in the market transaction are each necessarily engaged with
what they are planning to do with the merchandise once they have
acquired it, otherwise the motivation for engaging in the trans-
action would disappear and the exchange would have no reason
to take place. It is for this reason that an exchange is an abstrac-
tion which, in the last resort, is inseparable from use. But we may
also note that these thoughts are essentially private: the speciﬁc
content that each partner has in mind (whether one wishes to
acquire some sodium chlorate for gardening, or to make a home-
made bomb, for example) does not enter into the exchange as
such.
- Concerning now the exchange, wemay note that it is an action,
and that this action is social; but that it is not thought of as such by
the agents. In a commodity exchange, whatever the agents think
about it (and even if they are not thinking about anything at all
other than their private motivations), two principles are tacitly
implied: (i) that of a mutual exclusion of property (what belongs
to A does not belong to B, and vice versa); (ii) the fact of obtaining
one object and giving up another does not result from a direct,
“natural” action (for example, as in theft), but from an exchange
involving mutual consent. In other words, the direct relation to
nature is suspended, and replaced by a social relation.
To sum up: what the owners of commodities do in the con-
text of a commodity exchange is effectively equivalent to practical
solipsism; and this is the case, quite independently of what the
agents concerned may or may not actually think or say about it.
There is thus indeed a telling correspondence between “solipsism”
as a philosophical category, and certain aspects of the exchange
abstraction.
The unicity of that which is
The ﬁrst thinker in human history who attained the sphere of
“pure thought”, a style of thought quite different from anything
that exists in traditional communal societies, was Parmenides
(Cornford, 1939). His central concept is designated, in Greek, by
the words τoεoν, which is generally translated as “the One; that
which is.” This entity is intrinsically and perpetually unchanging;
it occupies the whole of space; it lacks all the attributes of sensory
perception; it is strictly homogeneous and uniform; it is indivis-
ible; it is incapable of any sort of becoming or decaying; and it
is forever immobile. Parmenides emphasizes that the reality and
the being of this entity are such that it is intrinsically and literally
inconceivable to think that it does not exist. This reasoning is cen-
tral to his whole doctrine; and it marks the ﬁrst time in the whole
of human history that a conclusion is based on purely logical argu-
ments. Thus, the τoεoν is the starting-point for a thought-process
which proceeds by pure reasoning. In other words, what charac-
terizes this style of thought, quite unprecedented at that time, is
the fact that this purely conceptual thought grasps the dialectics
of truth and non-truth according to the canons of logical neces-
sity which is absolutely binding. Parmenides writes: “The fact of
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thinking, and the thought “it is,” are one and the same thing. For
you will never ﬁnd any thought divorced from that which is, from
what the thought is about. For there is not, and there never will
be, any thing other than that which is.” Hegel (1833) was later to
recognize himself perfectly in this stance, and comments: “This is
indeed the fundamental idea. Parmenides marks the beginning of
philosophy.”
We may note that the concept of τoεoν is a premise for the
logical arguments of Parmenides; but the origin of the con-
cept itself is enigmatic. One thing is clear at any rate: it is
a radically non-empirical concept. It is indeed totally evident
that no-one has ever seen (or heard, or touched, or tasted,
or smelt) anything at all which bears the least resemblance to
this τoεoν. In this respect, it is worth noting that neither Par-
menides, nor any of the other founders of Greek philosophy,
claim to have personally invented their key concepts themselves.
Parmenides never suggests, for example, that he arrived at this
concept by a process of generalization on the basis of multiple
cases in order to arrive at the level of a universal concept. The
abstractions which underlie these concepts are of a quite differ-
ent sort: one ﬁnds them already there, complete in themselves,
totally without any process by which they could be derived. They
come from elsewhere, outside and independently of any human
thought.
It is in this difﬁcult situation that Sohn-Rethel (1978) proposes
his audacious solution to the problem. According to him, the
concept of Parmenides corresponds in quite exemplary fashion to
a description of the abstract substance from which, ideally, money
should be made. A market commodity can be exchanged between
two private owners precisely to the extent that it has the capacity
to be constituted as the object of a mutual exclusion of ownership.
It is this capacity which makes it impossible for such a commodity
to belong simultaneously to two different owners: a commodity is
essentially one in the context of a rivalry between two owners.
What, precisely, does this “unicity” consist of? It has nothing
to do with the indivisibility of the commodity considered as a
material entity; it has nothing to do with its actual natural prop-
erties. In fact, what is brought into play is not the unicity of the
commodities themselves, but the unicity of their existence. The
ways in which a commodity can be perceived – as an object and
in terms of its possible use-value – are as diverse as the persons
who perceive it; but it exists in a single world which is common
to all the private individuals, and this is the world of market
exchanges.
The unicity of the exchange abstraction is thus absolutely fun-
damental, because it is this unicity which constitutes it as an
instrument capable of realizing the social synthesis; in otherwords,
of conferring on the society in question its coherence and its unity.
There is thus an astounding formal concordance between this
unicity of the exchange abstraction, and the ontological unicity
of the τoεoν of Parmenides which is the founding abstraction of
philosophical thought.
Abstract quantity
The work of the formalist school of mathematics (Weir, 2011),
notably following Hilbert, have made quite explicit something
which was up until then merely implicit in the whole of “pure
mathematics”: this is the perfectly abstract quality of “natural
numbers.”The mathematical deﬁnition of these numbers involves
a notion of “abstract quantity” deﬁned by nothing other than the
relation “larger than” (>), “less than” (<), or “equal to” (=)7.
The fact that the very considerable work of the formalist school
was necessary to make these concepts explicit is an eloquent indi-
cation of their abstract, non-empirical nature. “Numbers” as we
experience them empirically are not at all built in this way (which
explains the abstruse, non-intuitive nature of “formal mathemat-
ics” which has given such headaches to pupils and teachers alike
in schools where a well-intentioned but possibly quite misguided
attempt has been made to introduce this new program of “mod-
ern maths”). Numbers as we come across them in daily life are
never separated from the objects that are to be counted; what
we can actually experience empirically are twenty sea-shells, or
twenty cows. But then, if the concept of “pure quantity” cannot be
derived from empirical experience, where on earth could it have
come from?
Sohn-Rethel (1978), continuing his analysis of the exchange
abstraction, sees an answer to this enigma in the following way.
The act of exchange contains within itself the postulate that the
two sets of commodities to be exchanged are equal. But how are
we to deﬁne and to characterize this “equality”? It does not reside
in the identity of the commodities, because if they were com-
pletely identical there would be no point in exchanging them;
only different commodities are exchanged. Neither are the com-
modities considered to be equal in the minds of the agents,
because their action would become absurd if they did not see
any advantage in realizing the exchange. What is more, this sort
of evaluation only exists in the solipsistic register of each indi-
vidual conscience; from one person to another, such evaluations
are not comparable. Nevertheless, it is of the very essence of
the postulate of equality that it transcends the gulf of experience
between the agents. The postulate of equality does not derive from
their experience; the only thing they to agree is that the two sets
of commodities can be exchanged. The two sets of commodi-
ties are rendered equal by the very act of exchange; they are not
exchanged in virtue of any sort of “equality” that they possess in
themselves.
An act of exchange of this sort, which ends up by postulating
the equality of the sets of commodities, may well be preceded by a
negotiation, by a sort of petty bargaining where what is at stake for
each agent is “take more” and “give less.” Now it is true that many
commodities can be measured in dimensional units (tons, gallons,
square metres, and so on). But the comparative terms “more” and
“less”employedduring thebargainingdonot involve a quantitative
comparison between, for example, tons of coal, gallons of petrol,
or square yards of fabric. The relational equation postulated by an
act of exchange leaves behind it all such dimensional measure, and
establishes a level of pure non-dimensional quantity. At the end of
all this we ﬁnd, very precisely, the level of pure numbers deﬁned
by nothing other than “>,”“<,” and “=.”
7I thank one of the reviewers for pointing out that technically, the deﬁnition of
“natural numbers” also requires the core concept of a “successor function.” Sohn-
Rethel does not address of the notion of a“successor function,”nor the passage from
“abstract quantity” to “natural number.”
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Abstract time and space
In the list of categories of synthetic a priori judgement, as Kant set
them out, an important place is occupied by the concepts of time
and space. This space is that of Euclidean geometry: it is notably
characterized by the fact of being rigorously homogeneous and
isotropic. As Jaynes (1976) has pointed out with great perspicac-
ity, time is only accessible to reﬂexive consciousness, and indeed to
scientiﬁc thought, if it ismetaphorically transposed to this concep-
tual framework of an ideal space: in this context, “time” is nothing
other than a Euclidean point which advances uniformly along a
straight line which is also Euclidean. It may not be necessary to
dwell at length on the totally non-empirical nature of these con-
cepts, since this thematic leitmotiv is becoming familiar. The space
in which we move in the course of our daily life is anything but
homogeneous and isotropic (Merleau-Ponty, 1945). As embod-
ied beings, we are constantly subject to the anisotropic inﬂuence
of gravity (in fact even this characterization is already idealized
with respect to our phenomenologically immediate lived experi-
ence). And even the space of our movements in the two horizontal
dimensions is not homogeneous, being encumbered in all sorts of
ways. We have no perception of spatiality outside our actions (this
is particularly clear in the “enactive” approach to cognition and
perception). Now these actions are constitutively dependent on
the particularities of our embodiment and of our natural Umwelt ;
and both of these are anything but homogeneous and isotropic.
And as for time, considered as we have immediate lived experi-
ence of it, its “framing” by the metaphor of spatiality is in no way
empirically given; and on the other hand, it is characterized by
biological and psychological rhythms, day and night, which once
again are anything but homogeneous and linear. So where could
the rigorous ideality of the Euclidean conceptions come from?
As we may expect, Sohn-Rethel (1978) sees the source of this
ideal abstraction in the switch which comes when the categories
of space are applied not at the level of use, but at the level of
market exchanges. At the level of use, which we interpret here
as covering the totality of all human activities in relation with
nature, space, and time are inextricably linked to natural events
and human activities: as for example in the ripening of harvests,
the seasons of the year, hunting animals, the birth, and death
of human beings, and generally everything that happens in the
course of life. Now every act of exchange requires abstracting
away from all this, because the commodities are supposed to be
quite immutable during the whole duration of the exchange. The
transaction does take a certain lapse of time, because one must
include the delivery of the commodities and the payment which
concludes the exchange. But the totality of this time is emptied of
all the material realities which make up its content at the level of
use.
Very similar considerations apply to space, for example the dis-
tance that the commodities must cover when they change owners.
While the commodities are in transit from the old to the new
owner, the equality between the two sets of commodities holds at
each position and at each instant in exactly the same manner as
at any other position and time. It is for this reason that time and
space, when they are applied to the exchange, must be perfectly
homogeneous. They are also continuous, in the sense that they
allow for an interruption at any moment during the transit. In
other words, the exchange abstraction excludes everything which
makes up history, whether it be human history or natural history.
The empirical reality of facts and events, and their descriptions
which make it possible to differentiate one local time and position
with respect to another, is entirely obliterated. This is how time
and space acquire that character of universality and atemporality
which must mark the exchange abstraction in each of its traits.
Substance and accidents
It is well known that Aristotelian logic operates a fundamental dis-
tinction between the “essential” properties of an object – in brief,
the necessary and sufﬁcient properties for an object to belong
to a certain class of objects (for example, being “a tree,” “a cat,”
and so on) – and the “accidental” or contingent properties, those
that an object can have (or not) without affecting its member-
ship of a class (for example, the fact that a cat is gray or ginger).
In its more highly developed form, this distinction becomes that
between“primary”properties – in physics, these reduce essentially
to the mass, the position and the state of movement of a parti-
cle – and “secondary” properties such as its color, its sound, its
smell and so on. It is pretty evident that this conceptual scheme –
which gives pride of place, need it be said, to the“essential”or“pri-
mary”properties – is the exact opposite of the empirical situation,
for everything that can actually be perceived is relegated to the
status of “accidental” or “secondary” properties. But if the “essen-
tial,”“primary” properties are non-empirical, where do they come
from?
Sohn-Rethel (1978) once again ﬁnds an answer in the exchange
abstraction. In fact, we have already largely presented what is at
stake: the “ideal” substance of which money should, ideally, be
made is very precisely devoid of all sensory qualities; all that
remains are the properties necessary for it to transit in abstract
space and time. Let us recall, once again that we are dealing with
an “abstraction” precisely because the use-value of a commodity
(and without which it would actually not have any exchange-value
either) is constituted precisely by its empirical qualities.
The continuous and the discontinuous
One of the grand themes which characterize the whole tradition
of Western mathematics is the tense opposition between the con-
tinuous and the discrete (Salanskis, 1992). Already in ancient
Greece, this gave rise to the paradoxes of Zeno – Achilles who
would arguably never quite catch up with the tortoise. Another
key moment was the invention of differential calculus by Leib-
niz and Newton. Once again, this is a concept that does not arise
in the empirical sphere of daily practice; and once again, Sohn-
Rethel (1978) ﬁnds roots for it in the exchange abstraction. On
the basis of what we have already said, and summing up, it is
clear that an act of exchange must, intrinsically, be described as the
abstract movement, in abstract space and time (i.e., homogeneous,
continuous and empty) of abstract substances (materially real but
devoid of any sensory qualities) which do not undergo any mate-
rial change and which can only be differentiated in a quantitative
and non-dimensional manner. Now on one hand the constancy of
the exchange value confers a continuity to the whole process of
exchange; but on the other, it must be possible to interrupt the
movement of the commodities at any place and time in order to
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verify the constancy of their value, and this cuts their movement
up into a number of discrete packets. This contradictory nature,
both continuous and discrete, comes from the social origin of their
abstract nature.
The transcendental
A ﬁnal element in this list resides in the feature that above and
beyond the relatively ﬁne and speciﬁc details of the homologies
we have examined in a–f, there is an over-riding, generic char-
acteristic of the conceptual categories. Although philosophers are
general silent (not to say evasive) concerning the genetic origin
of the Kantian categories, they all agree that these categories are
both “given” a priori in a non-empirical fashion, and at the same
time absolutely compelling in their apodictic normativity. “Logic”
in this sense has the property that it could not be other than what
it is. This is the meaning of the philosophical term “transcen-
dental.” But where could this remarkable property come from?
Once again, we ﬁnd a corresponding characteristic on the side
of the exchange abstraction. This abstraction is indeed founded
not on empirical facts, but on social postulates; and there is a
sense in which they postulates could not be other than they are,
on pain of the entire ediﬁce collapsing (and in this case, in the
framework of a market society, all activities of production and
consumption would cease and the whole society would materi-
ally collapse). We can make an impressive list of these postulates
which all have in common this feature that on the one hand
they are pure postulates, but at the same time endowed with a
sort of intrinsic necessity. Thus: it is a postulate that the use of
commodities should be suspended until the action of exchange is
completed; that no modiﬁcation should occur in the physical state
of the commodities, and that this postulate must be maintained
even if empirical facts would seem to run counter to it; that the
commodities which are exchanged should count as equivalent in
spite of all their manifest empirical differences; that the fact of
acquiring and giving up commodities is bound to a priori condi-
tions concerning their exchangeability; that commodities change
owners by transiting from one place to another without being
materially affected, and that this movement occurs in an “empty”
space. None of these formal concepts invokes any sort of empir-
ical, factual observation; they are all norms that the exchange of
market commodities must satisfy in order to implement the social
synthesis.
Conclusion
Having examined in some detail several of the “homologies” iden-
tiﬁed by Sohn-Rethel, this may be the place to pause and to
pose anew the question of the status of these homologies; in
other words, the nature of the putative relation between forms
of social life and forms of thought. Quite generally, if there is
a correlation between two entities X and Y, and this correlation
is not merely an illusion due to pure chance, there can be three
reasons for this. It may be that variation in X is a cause of vari-
ation in Y; or that variation in Y is a cause of variation in X;
or yet again that there is a common cause of variation in both
X and Y (of course these three possibilities are not necessarily
mutually exclusive). In the present case, the initial formulation
of the question by Durkheim tended to suggest that there was
a causal relation in the direction from social forms to concep-
tual forms. But we have already suggested, at the end of section
3, that the relation almost certainly functions also in the other
direction: the cognitive capacity to think in a certain way is a
condition for the corresponding form of social life to arise. And
ﬁnally, reﬂection on the nature of the “homologies” proposed by
Sohn-Rethel (1978) raises a third possibility. We have empha-
sized, concerning the τoεoν of Parmenides, the apodictic nature
of the concept; it seems to have a sort of inner necessity, such
that it could not be other than it is. And concerning the cate-
gory of the “transcendental,” we have again noted this apodictic
quality that has so impressed philosophers over the centuries; but
we suggested there that this striking quality is in resonance with
the fact that the various aspects of the exchange abstraction are
also pure postulates with a sort of intrinsic necessity. In other
words, the social forms and the conceptual forms we have been
examining have a fundamental feature in common. To sum up,
it would seem that all three of the possible reasons for a correla-
tion between social forms and conceptual forms make a signiﬁcant
contribution.
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
The “homologies” that we have examined in the previous section
are based on the state of affairs at a particular point in time and
place. This situation – that of Ancient Greece – is indeed a key
moment; but it is nevertheless only one moment in a continuous
and ongoing process. The relationship between forms of thought
and forms of social life comes into fresh light if we look at their
co-evolution in the course of human history.
If we take as a starting-point our pre-hominid ancestors, the
totemic systems of the aborigine societies that we examined in
section 2 already represent a ﬁrst appearance of a form that is both
social and conceptual.
The second major step is one that we have also seen already:
the identiﬁcation of the major conceptual categories of West-
ern thought by the Ancient Greeks. What is nevertheless worth
remarking here is the amazing historical coincidence of time and
place: Athens, around 400 BC, saw both the work of Plato and
Aristotle, and the inversion of coined money. An additional factor,
which is of both social and cognitive importance, is that this was
also the epoch of the invention of alphabetic writing (see Goody,
1977 for a fuller exposition of the signiﬁcance of this momentous
event, which marked the entry into history in the modern sense of
the term).
The third step is that of the European Renaissance, in the
16th and 17th centuries. As its name implies, this was a period
of a return to the high intellectual ideals of Ancient Greece,
after the decline of the Roman Empire and the interlude of the
“Dark Ages.” It was more than just a return, however; since
this was also the period of the birth of “Modern Science.” What
is to be noted here is that the Greeks invented almost all the
concepts under the sun; but they did not really put them to
use to discover new, fundamental knowledge. In a sense, the
Greek concepts were strangely static; it is almost as though their
canonical nature, their apodictic characterwhich theGreeks them-
selves thematized explicitly, left them bereft of the possibility of
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development. The spirit of modern science contrasts with this: sci-
entiﬁc concepts are eminently put to use to create unprecedented
knowledge; and because they are used in this way, they themselves
evolve.
Is there a corresponding difference in the character of the
exchange abstraction? If we look for it, the answer is yes. For
the Greeks, money was used essentially as a means of external
commercial exchanges (Scheidel et al., 2007). Domestic produc-
tion was not involved; to put it bluntly, this is because it was
performed by slaves who were not paid money for their work.
This is precisely what changed at the Renaissance, which was also
the period of the invention of Capitalism. The key point is that
now, money was invested in the production process itself, with the
invention of salaried labor. And need it be pointed out that Cap-
italism is intrinsically dynamic: the capital invested is returned
with a proﬁt, which can then be reinvested and so on, leading to
a potentially exponential growth. This ﬁts remarkably with the
fact that at the heart of modern science, most notably with New-
ton, there is the concept of a dynamic system; or more precisely, a
State-DeterminedDynamic System (SDDS;Aubin andDalmedico,
2002). There is probably no better way of illustrating the fecundity
of our hypothesis of a profound link between conceptual forms
and social forms, than to use it in a back-and-forth fashion to
sharpen our identiﬁcations of both sides of the relation. What
then can the concept of a SDDS point to in the functioning of
Capitalism?
An important feature is that a SDDS is perfectly“autonomous”:
once it is set up, and the dynamic law governing the temporal
evolution of its “state” is speciﬁed, everything thenceforth occurs
without the least“external”intervention. Laplace,who emphasized
the radical determinismof such a system, is reputed to have replied
toNapoleonwhen the latter questionedhimabout theplace of God
in his system: “Sire, I have no need of that hypothesis” (Rouse Ball,
1908). This can point us to the fact that in a truly capitalist system,
the process of production is theoretically automatic. It is true that it
is common to speak of a capitalist of this sort as a“manufacturer”–
as though Mr Ford, for example, had really made thousands and
thousands of cars with his own hands; but this is misleading. How
does the capitalist fulﬁll his role as a “producer”? He does not
accomplish this by his own work: he achieves it neither with his
hands, nor with tools and machines that he would operate himself.
He achieves it by means of the money he has invested as capital,
and with nothing else. “The process of work is a process between
entities that the capitalist has bought,” says Marx (1867), “entities
that belong to him.” In fact, if ever a capitalist did come to lend
a hand himself, that would only show that he had partially failed
in this role as a capitalist entrepreneur, and strictly speaking he
should pay himself a salary for that manual work. In other words,
the role of “producer” falls on an entity which does not perform
a single productive function in the work-process. To sum up the
essential point: the key characteristic of the production process,
from the point of view of the capitalist entrepreneur who invests
in it, is that this process should function all by itself. The power of
the capitalist system resides in this postulate of the self-acting or
“automatic” nature of the production process.
It is important to note that a postulate of this sort does not
necessarily correspond to a historical reality; in fact, as we shall
see below, it will require centuries before the social reality of
production relations began very progressively to assume the ideal
form that we have just described; and even then they did so imper-
fectly. This only makes it clearer than ever that the postulate of
the automaticity of production processes does not come from any
empirical source in the actual technology of production; it is rather
the other way round, the fact that in the course of the historical
evolution of technology the latter progressively comes to conform
to the“ideal” in question is a consequence rather than a cause of this
postulate. The postulate itself is in no way empirical; it is clearly in
the realm of the non-empirical a priori; and what we have seen is
that it is formally intrinsic to the social relations of production in
a capitalist society. The formal homology between this postulate,
which is social through and through, and the Newtonian concept
of a SDDS which is also based on a postulate, is quite impressive.
Finally, we come to the contemporary period. The lead here is
given by the idea that we have just expressed: theoretically, from
the point of view of a capitalist, proﬁts should ensue automati-
cally. Now it may be thought that this idea is a little far-fetched;
in a small start-up enterprise, the budding capitalist is likely to do
quite a bit of the work himself; and even later, when the enterprise
has grown, he still has to do a lot of real work – buying the raw
materials, setting up the factory, and equipping it with all the nec-
essary tools, hiring the salaried workers and putting them to work,
ensuring that their salary demandswill not become excessive – and
even then he has not ﬁnished, because he must take care of mar-
keting the products once they have been made. But the fact is that
history has taken care of bringing to light the kernel of truth in
this theoretical idea: over the last century, the core of capitalism
has shifted away from entrepreneurial capitalism to the ﬁnancial
sector. Today shareholders, and at a larger scale the great ﬁnancial
corporations, indeed do little else than accumulate the proﬁts and
reinvest them on the ﬁnancial markets; thus coming remarkably
close to the theoretical ideal.
So much for the “social relations” side of the picture. What
about the “cognitive” side? Here again, it is the theme of
“automaticity” that provides the insight. The hallmark of the
contemporary scene is the digital computer, which is playing an
ever-increasing role. It may not be necessary to labor the point:
the essential feature of a computer is that operations on formal
symbols are carried out automatically and, thanks to electronic
technology, with ever greater speed and capacity. The full signif-
icance of this comes from the fact that this automaticity is not
restricted to merely abstract operations, but that it is being linked
to real material production. A clear indication of this is the ever-
increasing importance of robots in the production-line; at a deeper
level, it is important and fascinating to realize that what has made
this link-up possible and effective is the wealth of scientiﬁc knowl-
edge that has been accumulated since the Renaissance. It is indeed
modern science that provides the link between conceptual forms
on one hand, and the possibility of effective material action on the
other.
An important consequence of this automatization of the
production process is that the social institution of salaried employ-
ment is coming under pressure. Mass unemployment is of course
a social scourge, and is morally unacceptable. However, it is
equally clear that as production processes tend towards complete
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automation, there will be less and less materially productive work
to go round. The question is whether it is appropriate to resist this
trend; or whether any such attempt is akin to King Canute order-
ing the sea-tide not to advance, and thus doomed in advance. This
is a political question, to which we will return in conclusion.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
A century after Durkheim made the audacious suggestion that
the fundamental conceptual categories may have an origin in the
forms of social life, this hypothesis has still not received serious
attention by the academic community. Concomitantly, and this
is in all probability this is not an accident, the question of the
origin of the conceptual categories (when it is not simply eluded)
is still in the state of wavering between the twin alternatives of
apriorism and empiricism which remain equally unsatisfactory
for the very reasons so clearly exposed by Durkheim. It is difﬁcult
to avoid the haunting impression that all is not well in the house of
Reason.
To sum up the arguments presented in this paper, our ﬁnal
conclusion is that there is indeed a strong relationship between
social forms and conceptual forms, including the case of societies
governed by a market economy. Indeed, we may go so far as to
suggest that social forms and conceptual forms may actually be
inseparable; and this for three convergent reasons. Firstly, speciﬁc
cognitive forms are necessary for the social form to function (more
speciﬁcally, only humans are able to understand what “money”
is – cf the anecdote of the dog at the butcher). Secondly, the
evolution of social forms (more speciﬁcally, the successive forms
of capitalism) drives a corresponding evolution in mental forms.
Finally, the cognitive forms and social forms in question share a
fundamental, constitutive characteristic, that of abstraction.
Now if there really is such a strong relationship between the
forms of social life and the prevalent forms of thought, a question
maywell be asked: why is it that this relationship is notmore imme-
diately apparent, both to analysts and to members of the societies
in question?An attempt to answer to this searching questionbrings
us to the domain of ideology – the particular hallmark of success-
ful ideology being that it does not appear as such. Two illustrations
may help make this point. Contemporary capitalism has reached a
near-perfect stage8, where immense proﬁts ensue to the ﬁnancial
sector for doing practically nothing of any social utility – but these
proﬁts seem virtually invisible, both to the tax-collector (the rate
of taxation on capital gains is less than that on the salaried earnings
of the common worker), and to public consciousness which seems
to ﬁnd this situation quite normal; all this at a time when much
is made of the “economic crisis,” and national governments are
heavily in debt and held to severe budgetary restrictions. Another
illustration of this impressive blindness concerns the situation we
have already described, created by the fact that the processes of
production are in large part automated. One might have thought
that this would open up near-utopian perspectives: if these gains
in productivity could be shared in a socially equitable fashion,
all members of society would be able to devote the main part of
their waking hours to activities that they considered intrinsically
8“Near-perfect” in its own twisted terms – of course this is anything but “perfect”
from a humanistic point of view.
rewarding. But instead of that, the very same situation is widely
interpreted as a demoralizing threat to salaried employment.
To link these considerations with our previous discussion, we
may recall the remark of Marx when he says that the exchange
abstraction never receives a mental representation as such, since
its sole expression resides in the act of considering that the value
of one commodity is equal to the value of another. Putting this
together with the illustrations of our social ignorance, there need
be little surprise that we are largely unaware of the implications of
our social situation. The fact that we have no clear consciousness
of the effects of our social life on the way we function cogni-
tively cannot be taken as evidence against the hypothesis put
forward in this paper. The illustrations also show, however, that
this social ignorance has deleterious consequences. Consequently,
if the arguments presented here can contribute to even a modest
increase in our social awareness, this paper will have been well
worthwhile.
Finally, I return to the more general issue addressed in the
introduction to this paper: the importance accorded to the
social dimension by Cognitive Science. In the space of a sin-
gle article, it has obviously been out of the question to treat
this issue exhaustively. The methodological choice has been
made to proceed by metonymy, by concentrating on a case
study. The speciﬁc domain that has been selected – the ori-
gin of conceptual categories – reveals that the social dimension
has indeed been systematically ignored. Two major contribu-
tions in this area, those of Durkheim and Sohn-Rethel, have
received virtually no serious attention by the academic com-
munity. Our re-examination of this work has shown that these
studies are certainly incomplete, but are basically sound. The
conclusion is that there is a call for in-depth follow-up of
this question. And enlarging beyond this metonymical exam-
ple, the social dimension of cognition is worthy of substantial
development.
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